Gallipoli - Letter from Admiral Hornby to W.H. Smith

Admiral Geoffrey Hornby

Besika Bay

Feb. 8, 1878

To the Right Hon. W. H. Smith, M.P.

The Russians are said to have 3000 men at Rodosto, sixty miles from Bulair ; a force—amount unknown—at Kissen, thirty miles off; and the roads from the north, through Malgara, and generally, are bad. I think, therefore, they could not approach the place under three days, or have a large force there in less than six days.

In twenty-four hours we could land at Gallipoli a naval brigade of 500 men, and flank the approaches to a certain extent in the ships. This would give the Turks the encouragement and assurance they require, after their recent defeats, to hold the ground for a few days. If orders were sent to the Governor of Malta to co-operate with me, I should send Agincourt, Achilles, and Raleigh to Malta, and they should return in eight days to Gallipoli with 3000 troops. (Distance to Malta, 690 miles; return to Gallipoli, 730 miles.) Steamers should be chartered at Malta, and despatched forty eight hours after receipt of the telegram, bringing guns, ammunition, biscuit, rum, and cocoa for the troops, and 2000 tons of coals for this squadron. With 3500 English, the ships, and the Turks, I believe we should hold the place for a fortnight against anything the Russians could do.

By that time—that is, twenty-two days from the receipt of your telegram—you ought to be able to send us the 8000 or 10,000 men that would make this place safe for ever. The first steps will be the most important, and of course the orders must be prompt and decided from home. Troops, ships, and Ambassador would then co-operate. Transport animals and temporary shelter for the troops will be the greatest difficulty, but I believe we can meet them. You may depend I will feed and shelter my own men, and I have great confidence in our contractor, who is an Englishman. I mention this only that you may not suppose such matters have not been considered.

Yours faithfully

                        G. Phipps Hornby

Gallipoli - The Russo-Turkish War

In April 1876 a revolt had broke out in Bulgaria. A minor, if bloody affair, the matter would escalate over the next two years, dragging in one by one four of the Great Powers of Europe until the world was on the brink of a global war.

This was to be the last time the Great Powers would fight before the First World War. The conflict created the borders of southwestern Europe that we know today, and saw the first use of the Red crescent flag. 

In the grander scheme of things, the Bulgarian revolt was part of the long decline of the Ottoman Empire. In 1683 it had been on the verge of capturing Vienna, but now had only a toe hold in Europe. But even as the Ottoman Empire declined, its great enemy, the Austrian Empire, had also waned. The balance of power in Europe was shifting. France had been humbled by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and so the mightiest powers in Europe were Germany, with it's great industry, Russian, with its rapidly expanding empire in Central Asia, and, of course, Britain, whose industry and empire were both the envy of the world. 

It was in the interests of Russia that the Ottoman's be driven from the Balkans, so the slavs of its Christian provinces could join the Russian Empire, and it was in the interests of Britain that they stay, so that Russia could not gain a Mediterranean port from which she could threaten the flow of trade through the Suez Canal to Britain. It was in the interests of Germany that there should be peace.  

In 1854 France and Britain had come to Turkey's aid when Russia had attacked. This time France was not a player and public opinion in Britain, outraged by the behaviour of Turkish irregulars was not on the side of the Ottomans. 

Russian first bought off Austria-Hungary by offering them the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovia, then used her ally Serbia to attempt to capture Bulgaria. When this failed, she declared war herself. 

The forces were actually fairly even. 300,000 Russians faced 200,000 Turks, who had the advantage of interior lines of communication, control of the sea, and fortified positions. In terms of abilities the two sides were very different. Russians who were strategically aggressive but tactically inept. The Ottomans were strategically passive but tactically brilliant. 

This was shown by the fate of Osman Pasha, and his army of 30,000 men. Outmanoevred and surrounded, he then fought off a succession of Russian attacks in a siege that would make him famous and preserve Ottoman Europe for another forty years. 

After the third failed attack on Osman's position in the unremarkable town of Plevna, when Csar Nicholas II and invited dignitaries from across Europe watched 100,000 Russian soldiers fail to defeat a force less than a third of their size, the Russians called in General Todleben, the hero of Sevastopol. He encircled the town with siege works and when the starving Turks attempted to break out they were repulsed in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The next day Osman Pasha surrendered.

It was now December 1877. Constantinople was held by no more than 20,000 Turkish troops. By the end of January 1878 the Russian army had reached the village of San Stefano, nine miles west of Constantinople. Fearing that the great city would fall, British Prime Minister Disraeli sent the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet through the Dardanelles to defend it. At the same time 200,000 Austro-Hungarian troops were massing on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The stage was now set for a confrontation between the Great Powers. 

South Africa - Campaign Overview

The history of South Africa from 1877 to 1881 is of a three-cornered struggle between Britain, the Boer Republics and the Zulus. With the exception of a couple of sorties over the frontier, the fighting took place entirely in the Transvaal and Zululand. Combined with the relatively small sizes of the forces involved, this would make a very manageable map campaign. Indeed, I even read once of someone playing the whole thing out on a single large wargame table.

However, my principle of changing as little as possible will be maintained instead. By making just four changes to what happened historically a series of battles can be generated that are both different and, at the same time, familiar enough to make them enjoyable to gamers who know the history of South Africa and those who don't.

Firstly, Chelmsford receives the two battalions that arrived in December 1878 - South Africa was an important strategic location for the British Empire, after all - but after that no more, except for HMS Shah, if she's still afloat.

Secondly, in responding to the British invasion, Cetswayo sends 6000 warriors to face Chelmsford, and the other 20,000 to take on Pearson's column. The battles of Isandhlwana and Nyezane take place as they did historically, but with the Zulu forces exchanged.

Thirdly, Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande and his 4000 men of the Undi corps cross into Natal just as they did in real life, but their target is not Rorke's Drift. Instead they cross the Lower Drift and look for targets down there.

Fourthly, the Transvaal Boers don't revolt in 1880, but in February 1879, whilst Britain is doubly distracted. General Wood's northern column is diverted from Luneberg to deal with them.

These changes allow us to fight historical battles with slightly altered ORBATs, and fictitious battles with the forces from real battles. The result is still a three-cornered war, but one whose outcome is less certain than real life. The British are really up against it in this re-run of history, whilst the Zulus and the Boers both have a real chance of success.

The Admiralty's orders to Admiral Hornby

Admiralty, London, 6.40 p.m., Jan. 23, to Admiral, Vourla, 11.55 A.M., Jan. 24. " Secret. " 

Sail immediately for Dardanelles and proceed with the fleet now with you to Constantinople. Abstain from taking any part in contest between Russia and Turkey, but waterway of Straits is to be kept open, and in the event of tumult at Constantinople, protect life and property of British subjects. Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as may be necessary to preserve waterway of Dardanelles, but do not go above Constantinople. Report departure, and communicate with Besika for possible further orders, but do not wait if none are there. Keep your destination absolutely secret.

Gallipoli - Letter from Admiral Hornby to Lord Derby

Admiral Hornby

Besika Bay 

10 August 1877

 

Lord Derby

The War Office

London

Sir,

I assume that you think the batteries of the Dardanelles would not prevent the squadron passing into the Sea of Marmora whenever it pleased, and that in passing it might, with small delay and damage, destroy them. In that opinion I concur, but I doubt if you realise what might follow.

If the northern shore of the Dardanelles were occupied by an enemy, I think it very doubtful if we could play any material part; and if the Bosphorus also was under their command, it would be almost impossible. In the latter case, we could not get even the Heraclea coal. In the former, our English supply of coal, our ammunition, and perhaps our food, would in my opinion be stopped. This opinion depends on the topography of the north shore. If you will send for the chart of the Dardanelles, No. 2429, you will see that from three and a half miles below Kilid Bahar to Ak Bashi Imian, six and a half miles above it, an almost continuous cliff overhangs the shore-line, while the Straits close to half a mile in one part, and are never more than two miles wide. An enemy in possession of the peninsula would be sure to put guns on commanding points of those cliffs. All the more if the present batteries, which are a Jleur d'eau, were destroyed. Such guns could not fail to stop transports and colliers, and would be most difficult for men-of-war to silence. We should have to fire at them with considerable elevation. Shots which were a trifle low would lodge harmlessly in the sandstone cliffs ; those a trifle high would fly into the country, without the slightest effect on the gunners except amusement.

It is for these reasons that the possession of the Bulair lines by a strong and friendly force seems to every one here to be imperative, if now, or hereafter, you should want to act at Constantinople. The Turks are making progress with them ; but they are unarmed, not garrisoned, and the garrison that would be sent to them in case of reverse would probably be part of a beaten and dispirited force. Is it wise to risk our vital interests in such hands ? The Russians take advantage of being at war to destroy the Sulina navigation, ' for strategical purposes.' Are we to have no strategical purposes' because we are a neutral? I think even Freeman, Gladstone, & Co. would not hear unmoved that the Dardanelles were closed; but when they are closed, it will be too late to act. Now, I believe there is time to prevent it, and for that reason I write. I want to see 10,000 British troops occupying Gallipoli in concert with the Turks; and Mr Layard misinforms me, if the Turks would not ask for, and welcome, such an occupation.

Yours faithfully

                   Geoffrey Hornby

                          

Afghanistan - The British Indian Army

The Indian Army that marched through the Khyber Pass towards Kabul really needs very little introduction. Some of its regiments; the Gurkhas, the Guides and the Bengal Lancers, were amongst the most famous in the world, and its exploits would be the subject of Boy's Own tales of daring-do for most of the next century. But what actually was the Indian Army?

The Indian Army was one of the greatest benefits of the Britain gained from its empire. As a naval power, she had only ever maintained a small standing army. However, possession of India gave Britain the use of the only modern, professional fighting force outside of Europe and North America. What's more, the Indian Army was paid for entirely by the India taxpayers. Even the 65,000 soldiers of the British Army stationed in India were paid for by the Indians. 

As well as excursions in the Afghanistan and Burma, the Indian Army would find itself deployed as far afield as Egypt, Sudan, China and Abyssinia. From the Suez Canal to Hong Kong, the Indian army was the premier military power over nearly half the surface of the globe. 

The Indian Army's officers were thoroughly professional. The British Army may have abolished the purchase of commissions in 1871, but this didn't stop the officer corps being dominated by those with inherited wealth. As it was essentially impossible to live on an officers pay at home, the talented, but impoverished, officers made their way to the Indian Army. There they commanded Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus who were long-service volunteers who took their soldiering seriously. 

Since 1842, the frontiers of the British Empire had pushed forwards to the Afghan border. The job of pacifying the fiercely independent tribes of the Northwest Frontier had given the Indian Army plenty of experience in mountain warfare. They had learnt the hard way the importance of crowning the heights and covering a withdrawal. So, the Indian army marched into Afghanistan confident in its officers, its men and its tactics. However, there were problems.

Firstly, in 1878, the Indian Army didn't really exist. There was a Commander-in-Chief, accountable to the Viceroy, and in 1878 this was general Sir Frederick Haines, a veteran of the Crimean War. However, the native regiments all remained, with the exception of the small Punjab Frontier Force, under the control of the three 'presidencies' of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. There was no single 'Indian Army' at all. The disorganisation didn't stop there though. The Military Department, responsible for the supply of men, munitions and stores, was accountable directly to the Viceroy, and not under the control of the commander-in-chief. Important decisions could be kicked about between the CinC, the Military Department and the three presidencies endlessly. 

The job of supplying the army meanwhile had essentially been privatised. Quartermasters went on campaign with a chest of money, but nothing else. The actual supplies were bought from private venders who followed the army in a huge caravan. Camp followers in Indian armies usually outnumbered the actual soldiers by four to one. The system was barley adequate at the best of times, and when the supply lines extended over a hundred miles across treacherous mountain passes, where the locals thought nothing of helping themselves as the convoys went past, almost collapsed. Medical facilities were also inadequate, and there was no Intelligence Department at all, . 

As well as not being unified, the Indian army wasn't concentrated either. Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Secunderabad, Lucknow, Bangalore and Calcutta had large barracks, but most of the army was scattered across the sub-continent in one and two regiment stations. These small stations were essentially a garrison keeping a potentially rebellious population in check. There was also a serious lack of organisation above the level of the regiment. What's more, even if there had been an organisation for these disparate regiments to be fitted in to, there was often no transport to carry them forwards, and, even more crucially, no alternative police force to fill the void if they did.

What's more, the fear of future mutinies meant that as the firepower revolution transformed the weaponry of the British Army, the Indian Army was always one step behind. When the British regiments received their fist breech loading rifles, the Indians held on to their old muzzle loaders. When the Martini-Henry came along it was issued to the British battalions, whilst the Indian regiments received the old Sniders. Against tribal opponents with jezails this made very little difference, but if asked to fight Russians with their new Berdan rifles, the Indian Army was likely to find itself outgunned. 

Another safety measure against a second mutiny was that, apart from the mountain guns of the Punjab Frontier Force, all the artillery was in British hands. With fifteen horse and 43 field batteries there was a reasonable number of cannons. However, the majority were 9 pounder muzzle loaders. This was a relatively light gun, by European standards, in 1878. The standard British field gun at the time was the 13 pounder. Also, by this time, the rets of Europe used breech loaders, leaving the British as the odd ones out still loading their guns at the front. Before recoil mechanisms came along breech loaders didn't enjoy a significant advantage in terms of rate of fire, but guns that loaded at the back usually had more range. 

The officers of the army were indeed exceptional, but there were also very few of them. The usual staff was seven, of which one was usually on furlough in Britain. A bloody battle or a sickly season could decimate the officers of a regiment. Each presidency had a pool of officers that were sent out to the regiments as needed. Alas, as there was no general staff, when brigades and divisions had to be formed in time of war, their staff had to be taken from the regiments, further depleting the number of officers. The lack of higher formations meant that whilst officers were promoted by time served, there was usually no more senior positions for them to move up to. As a result majors could be found commanding companies and lieutenant-colonels commanding wings.

The best officers would want to see action, and this meant service in the Northwest Frontier with the Bengal Army. Nobody wanted garrison duty in a remote and inhospitable station. So, whilst the leadership of the regiments most likely to see combat was excellent, those of the units that would make up the reserve was often questionable.

Indians could never become officers, and the highest one could rise was Subedar-Major, the equivalent of a Sergeant Major in the British Army. As promotion was also by seniority thy could also be elderly by the time they did so. Sita Ram, the only sepoy to have written a book about his experiences, eventually became a Subedar, but only after 48 years of service and at the age of 62. 

Which brings us on to the raw material of the army, the soldiers. The European regiments of the East India Company became part of the British Army when it ceased to exist. Indeed, in 1878, one, the former Bengal European Regiment, would be in Malta waiting to go into action under its new name of the 101st Regiment of Foot. The army consisted of Indians, but did not include every type of Indian. The British had a bizarre concept of 'martial races' from which they recruited. Generally, these were lighter skinned northern Indians. This limited the available manpower of the army. Also, as recruitment was the responsibility of the individual regiment, there was no way to replenish losses whilst on campaign.  

The Indian Army then was a more than adequate force for colonial policing. But, whilst it had the potential to become an army that could take on the best in the world as an equal, and in the twentieth century would do so. But in 1878 it had a number of weaknesses that would be found out in a prolonged conflict.

William Morris on the Eastern Question

To the Working-Men of England

Friends and fellow-citizens

There is danger of war; bestir yourselves to face that danger: if you go to sleep, saying we do not understand it, and the danger is far off, you may wake and find the evil fallen upon you, for even now it is at the door. Take heed in time and consider it well, for a hard matter it will be for most of us to bear war-taxes, war-prices, war-losses of wealth and work and friends and kindred: we shall pay heavily, and you, friends of the working classes, will pay the heaviest.

And what shall we buy at this heavy price? Will it be glory, and wealth and peace for those that come after us? Alas! no; for these are the gains of a just war; but if we wage the unjust war that fools and cowards are bidding us wage today, our loss of wealth will buy us fresh losses of wealth, our loss of work will buy us loss of hope, our loss of friends and kindred will buy us enemies from father to son.

An unjust war, I say: for do not be deceived! If we go to war with Russia now, it will not be to punish her for evil deeds done, or to hinder her from evil deeds hereafter, but to put down just insurrection against the thieves and murderers of Turkey; to stir up a faint pleasure in the hearts of the do-nothing fools that cry out without meaning for a ‘spirited foreign policy'; to guard our well-beloved rule in India from the coward fear of an invasion that may happen a hundred years hence – or never; to exhibit our army and navy once more before the wondering eyes of Europe; to give a little hope to our holders of Turkish bonds: Working-men of England, which of these things do you think worth starving for, worth dying for? Do all of them rolled into one make that body of English Interests we have heard of lately?

And who are they who flaunt in our faces the banner inscribed on one side English Interests, and on the other Russian Misdeeds? Who are they that are leading us into war? Let us look at these saviours of England’s honour, these champions of Poland, these scourges of Russia’s iniquities! Do you know them? Greedy gamblers on the Stock Exchange, idle officers of the army and navy (poor fellows!), worn-out mockers of the Clubs, desperate purveyors of exciting war-news for the comfortable breakfast tables of those who have nothing to lose by war, and lastly, in the place of honour, the Tory Rump, that we fools, weary of peace, reason and justice, chose at the last election to ‘represent’ us: and over all their captain, the ancient place-hunter, who, having at last climbed into an Earl’s chair, grins down thence into the anxious face of England, while his empty heart and shifty head is compassing the stroke that will bring on our destruction perhaps, our confusion certainly: O shame and double shame, if we march under such a leadership as this in an unjust war against a people who are not our enemies, against Europe, against freedom, against nature, against the hope of the world.

Working-men of England, one word of warning yet: I doubt if you know the bitterness of hatred against freedom and progress that lies at the hearts of a certain part of the richer classes in this country: their newspapers veil it in a kind of decent language; but do but hear them talking among themselves, as I have often, and I know not whether scorn or anger would prevail in you at their folly and insolence: these men cannot speak of your order, of its aims, of its leaders without a sneer or an insult: these men, if they had the power (may England perish rather), would thwart your just aspirations, would silence you, would deliver you bound hand and foot for ever to irresponsible capital – and these men, I say it deliberately, are the heart and soul of the party that is driving us to an unjust war: can the Russian people be your enemies or mine like these men are, who are the enemies of all justice? They can harm us but little now, but if war comes, unjust war, with all its confusion and anger, who shall say what their power may be, what step backward we may make? Fellow-citizens, look to it, and if you have any wrongs to be redressed, if you cherish your most worthy hope of raising your whole order peacefully and solidly, if you thirst for leisure and knowledge, if you long to lessen those inequalities which have been our stumbling-block since the beginning of the world, then cast aside sloth and cry out against an unjust war, and urge us of the Middle Classes to do no less, so that we may all protest solemnly and perseveringly against our being dragged (and who knows for why?) into an unjust war, in which, if we are victorious, we shall win shame, loss and rebuke; and if we are overpowered – what then?

Working-men of England: I do not believe that in the face of your strenuous opposition, the opposition of those men whom war most concerns, any English Government will be so mad as to trap England and Europe into an unjust war.

A Lover of Justice

11 May 1877