Afghanistan - The British Indian Army

The Indian Army that marched through the Khyber Pass towards Kabul really needs very little introduction. Some of its regiments; the Gurkhas, the Guides and the Bengal Lancers, were amongst the most famous in the world, and its exploits would be the subject of Boy's Own tales of daring-do for most of the next century. But what actually was the Indian Army?

The Indian Army was one of the greatest benefits of the Britain gained from its empire. As a naval power, she had only ever maintained a small standing army. However, possession of India gave Britain the use of the only modern, professional fighting force outside of Europe and North America. What's more, the Indian Army was paid for entirely by the India taxpayers. Even the 65,000 soldiers of the British Army stationed in India were paid for by the Indians. 

As well as excursions in the Afghanistan and Burma, the Indian Army would find itself deployed as far afield as Egypt, Sudan, China and Abyssinia. From the Suez Canal to Hong Kong, the Indian army was the premier military power over nearly half the surface of the globe. 

The Indian Army's officers were thoroughly professional. The British Army may have abolished the purchase of commissions in 1871, but this didn't stop the officer corps being dominated by those with inherited wealth. As it was essentially impossible to live on an officers pay at home, the talented, but impoverished, officers made their way to the Indian Army. There they commanded Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus who were long-service volunteers who took their soldiering seriously. 

Since 1842, the frontiers of the British Empire had pushed forwards to the Afghan border. The job of pacifying the fiercely independent tribes of the Northwest Frontier had given the Indian Army plenty of experience in mountain warfare. They had learnt the hard way the importance of crowning the heights and covering a withdrawal. So, the Indian army marched into Afghanistan confident in its officers, its men and its tactics. However, there were problems.

Firstly, in 1878, the Indian Army didn't really exist. There was a Commander-in-Chief, accountable to the Viceroy, and in 1878 this was general Sir Frederick Haines, a veteran of the Crimean War. However, the native regiments all remained, with the exception of the small Punjab Frontier Force, under the control of the three 'presidencies' of Bengal, Madras and Bombay. There was no single 'Indian Army' at all. The disorganisation didn't stop there though. The Military Department, responsible for the supply of men, munitions and stores, was accountable directly to the Viceroy, and not under the control of the commander-in-chief. Important decisions could be kicked about between the CinC, the Military Department and the three presidencies endlessly. 

The job of supplying the army meanwhile had essentially been privatised. Quartermasters went on campaign with a chest of money, but nothing else. The actual supplies were bought from private venders who followed the army in a huge caravan. Camp followers in Indian armies usually outnumbered the actual soldiers by four to one. The system was barley adequate at the best of times, and when the supply lines extended over a hundred miles across treacherous mountain passes, where the locals thought nothing of helping themselves as the convoys went past, almost collapsed. Medical facilities were also inadequate, and there was no Intelligence Department at all, . 

As well as not being unified, the Indian army wasn't concentrated either. Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Secunderabad, Lucknow, Bangalore and Calcutta had large barracks, but most of the army was scattered across the sub-continent in one and two regiment stations. These small stations were essentially a garrison keeping a potentially rebellious population in check. There was also a serious lack of organisation above the level of the regiment. What's more, even if there had been an organisation for these disparate regiments to be fitted in to, there was often no transport to carry them forwards, and, even more crucially, no alternative police force to fill the void if they did.

What's more, the fear of future mutinies meant that as the firepower revolution transformed the weaponry of the British Army, the Indian Army was always one step behind. When the British regiments received their fist breech loading rifles, the Indians held on to their old muzzle loaders. When the Martini-Henry came along it was issued to the British battalions, whilst the Indian regiments received the old Sniders. Against tribal opponents with jezails this made very little difference, but if asked to fight Russians with their new Berdan rifles, the Indian Army was likely to find itself outgunned. 

Another safety measure against a second mutiny was that, apart from the mountain guns of the Punjab Frontier Force, all the artillery was in British hands. With fifteen horse and 43 field batteries there was a reasonable number of cannons. However, the majority were 9 pounder muzzle loaders. This was a relatively light gun, by European standards, in 1878. The standard British field gun at the time was the 13 pounder. Also, by this time, the rets of Europe used breech loaders, leaving the British as the odd ones out still loading their guns at the front. Before recoil mechanisms came along breech loaders didn't enjoy a significant advantage in terms of rate of fire, but guns that loaded at the back usually had more range. 

The officers of the army were indeed exceptional, but there were also very few of them. The usual staff was seven, of which one was usually on furlough in Britain. A bloody battle or a sickly season could decimate the officers of a regiment. Each presidency had a pool of officers that were sent out to the regiments as needed. Alas, as there was no general staff, when brigades and divisions had to be formed in time of war, their staff had to be taken from the regiments, further depleting the number of officers. The lack of higher formations meant that whilst officers were promoted by time served, there was usually no more senior positions for them to move up to. As a result majors could be found commanding companies and lieutenant-colonels commanding wings.

The best officers would want to see action, and this meant service in the Northwest Frontier with the Bengal Army. Nobody wanted garrison duty in a remote and inhospitable station. So, whilst the leadership of the regiments most likely to see combat was excellent, those of the units that would make up the reserve was often questionable.

Indians could never become officers, and the highest one could rise was Subedar-Major, the equivalent of a Sergeant Major in the British Army. As promotion was also by seniority thy could also be elderly by the time they did so. Sita Ram, the only sepoy to have written a book about his experiences, eventually became a Subedar, but only after 48 years of service and at the age of 62. 

Which brings us on to the raw material of the army, the soldiers. The European regiments of the East India Company became part of the British Army when it ceased to exist. Indeed, in 1878, one, the former Bengal European Regiment, would be in Malta waiting to go into action under its new name of the 101st Regiment of Foot. The army consisted of Indians, but did not include every type of Indian. The British had a bizarre concept of 'martial races' from which they recruited. Generally, these were lighter skinned northern Indians. This limited the available manpower of the army. Also, as recruitment was the responsibility of the individual regiment, there was no way to replenish losses whilst on campaign.  

The Indian Army then was a more than adequate force for colonial policing. But, whilst it had the potential to become an army that could take on the best in the world as an equal, and in the twentieth century would do so, in 1878 it had a number of weaknesses that woud be found out in a prolonged conflict.