Gallipoli - The Russo-Turkish War

In April 1876 a revolt had broke out in Bulgaria. A minor, if bloody affair, the matter would escalate over the next two years, dragging in one by one four of the Great Powers of Europe until the world was on the brink of a global war.

This was to be the last time the Great Powers would fight before the First World War. The conflict created the borders of southwestern Europe that we know today, and saw the first use of the Red crescent flag. 

In the grander scheme of things, the Bulgarian revolt was part of the long decline of the Ottoman Empire. In 1683 it had been on the verge of capturing Vienna, but now had only a toe hold in Europe. But even as the Ottoman Empire declined, its great enemy, the Austrian Empire, had also waned. The balance of power in Europe was shifting. France had been humbled by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and so the mightiest powers in Europe were Germany, with it's great industry, Russian, with its rapidly expanding empire in Central Asia, and, of course, Britain, whose industry and empire were both the envy of the world. 

It was in the interests of Russia that the Ottoman's be driven from the Balkans, so the slavs of its Christian provinces could join the Russian Empire, and it was in the interests of Britain that they stay, so that Russia could not gain a Mediterranean port from which she could threaten the flow of trade through the Suez Canal to Britain. It was in the interests of Germany that there should be peace.  

In 1854 France and Britain had come to Turkey's aid when Russia had attacked. This time France was not a player and public opinion in Britain, outraged by the behaviour of Turkish irregulars was not on the side of the Ottomans. 

Russian first bought off Austria-Hungary by offering them the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovia, then used her ally Serbia to attempt to capture Bulgaria. When this failed, she declared war herself. 

The forces were actually fairly even. 300,000 Russians faced 200,000 Turks, who had the advantage of interior lines of communication, control of the sea, and fortified positions. In terms of abilities the two sides were very different. Russians who were strategically aggressive but tactically inept. The Ottomans were strategically passive but tactically brilliant. 

This was shown by the fate of Osman Pasha, and his army of 30,000 men. Outmanoevred and surrounded, he then fought off a succession of Russian attacks in a siege that would make him famous and preserve Ottoman Europe for another forty years. 

After the third failed attack on Osman's position in the unremarkable town of Plevna, when Csar Nicholas II and invited dignitaries from across Europe watched 100,000 Russian soldiers fail to defeat a force less than a third of their size, the Russians called in General Todleben, the hero of Sevastopol. He encircled the town with siege works and when the starving Turks attempted to break out they were repulsed in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The next day Osman Pasha surrendered.

It was now December 1877. Constantinople was held by no more than 20,000 Turkish troops. By the end of January 1878 the Russian army had reached the village of San Stefano, nine miles west of Constantinople. Fearing that the great city would fall, British Prime Minister Disraeli sent the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet through the Dardanelles to defend it. At the same time 200,000 Austro-Hungarian troops were massing on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The stage was now set for a confrontation between the Great Powers. 

The Admiralty's orders to Admiral Hornby

Admiralty, London, 6.40 p.m., Jan. 23, to Admiral, Vourla, 11.55 A.M., Jan. 24. " Secret. " 

Sail immediately for Dardanelles and proceed with the fleet now with you to Constantinople. Abstain from taking any part in contest between Russia and Turkey, but waterway of Straits is to be kept open, and in the event of tumult at Constantinople, protect life and property of British subjects. Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as may be necessary to preserve waterway of Dardanelles, but do not go above Constantinople. Report departure, and communicate with Besika for possible further orders, but do not wait if none are there. Keep your destination absolutely secret.

Gallipoli - Letter from Admiral Hornby to Lord Derby

Admiral Hornby

Besika Bay 

10 August 1877

 

Lord Derby

The War Office

London

Sir,

I assume that you think the batteries of the Dardanelles would not prevent the squadron passing into the Sea of Marmora whenever it pleased, and that in passing it might, with small delay and damage, destroy them. In that opinion I concur, but I doubt if you realise what might follow.

If the northern shore of the Dardanelles were occupied by an enemy, I think it very doubtful if we could play any material part; and if the Bosphorus also was under their command, it would be almost impossible. In the latter case, we could not get even the Heraclea coal. In the former, our English supply of coal, our ammunition, and perhaps our food, would in my opinion be stopped. This opinion depends on the topography of the north shore. If you will send for the chart of the Dardanelles, No. 2429, you will see that from three and a half miles below Kilid Bahar to Ak Bashi Imian, six and a half miles above it, an almost continuous cliff overhangs the shore-line, while the Straits close to half a mile in one part, and are never more than two miles wide. An enemy in possession of the peninsula would be sure to put guns on commanding points of those cliffs. All the more if the present batteries, which are a Jleur d'eau, were destroyed. Such guns could not fail to stop transports and colliers, and would be most difficult for men-of-war to silence. We should have to fire at them with considerable elevation. Shots which were a trifle low would lodge harmlessly in the sandstone cliffs ; those a trifle high would fly into the country, without the slightest effect on the gunners except amusement.

It is for these reasons that the possession of the Bulair lines by a strong and friendly force seems to every one here to be imperative, if now, or hereafter, you should want to act at Constantinople. The Turks are making progress with them ; but they are unarmed, not garrisoned, and the garrison that would be sent to them in case of reverse would probably be part of a beaten and dispirited force. Is it wise to risk our vital interests in such hands ? The Russians take advantage of being at war to destroy the Sulina navigation, ' for strategical purposes.' Are we to have no strategical purposes' because we are a neutral? I think even Freeman, Gladstone, & Co. would not hear unmoved that the Dardanelles were closed; but when they are closed, it will be too late to act. Now, I believe there is time to prevent it, and for that reason I write. I want to see 10,000 British troops occupying Gallipoli in concert with the Turks; and Mr Layard misinforms me, if the Turks would not ask for, and welcome, such an occupation.

Yours faithfully

                   Geoffrey Hornby

                          

Gallipoli - The Maps

With the Mediterreanan Fleet in Constantinople, it was essential that Britain secure the Dardanelles to prevent them becoming trapped as the Russians advanced. The Russians had not yet occupied this part of European Turkey yet, and so the British would hope that a swift amphibuous landing could capture the penisula before they arrived.

Some Ottoman soldiers would be in the area, but these would either be second rate irregulars or garrison troops. Unlike in 1915, this would essentially be a meeting engagement on land, rather than an opposed amphibious assault. The Gallipoli penisula is narrow, and so there will not be many map moves, whilst the small size of the opposing forces should still allow for mobile battles. 

So, in the blazing heat of a Medieterreanan summer, the first clash between the British lion and the Russian bear takes place. 

The events of 1915 mean that there are plenty of maps of the Gallipoli penisula around. Mostly, though, these are of the beaches to the east, which are unlikely to feature in the campaign. Great War maps also show the positions of the Turkish shore defences. These were far more extensive in 1915 than they were in 1878, but the major forts didn't move.

Rather more usefully, there was the Battle at Bulair in 1913. Bulair is the Bulgarian name for the town of Bolayir. The Bulgarians won the battle, hence they got to name it. Bolayir/Bulair is the key to the pennsula, and it the village in the top right of the map shown. the map below shows the 1913 battlefield. I see no reason to think it was substantially different in 1878. 

A joint British and French force landed in Galliopli during the Crimean War as well. The remains of the earthworks they dug still showed on later maps. Restablishing this would probably also be a priority in 1878. You can see it just to the southwest of Bolayir on this map. 

Bolayir will most likely be the scene of the action. However, the British will probably want a beachhead further west, and the Russians will be advancing from the east. This map shows more detail of the whole theatre, including Constantinople, where the Royal Navy is.

This map, meanwhile, shows the possible landing areas on the penisula.

Finally, whether it is the initial landing point or not, the British will want to use the port of Gallipoli, so here is a more detailed map. It is the same scale as the Bolayir map. 

Looking at those maps you may well be wondering how high thse hills are. The answer is, not that high at all. This, for example, is the view today looking Southwest from Bolayir. The rolling hills provide a vantage point for observation, but wouldn't be a huge obstacle to manoevre. 

Looking the other way, due north, the terrain is even flatter. This is very different to the ground that was fought over in 1915 and is perfect cavalry country.