Gallipoli - Letter from Admiral Hornby to W.H. Smith

Admiral Geoffrey Hornby

Besika Bay

Feb. 8, 1878

To the Right Hon. W. H. Smith, M.P.

The Russians are said to have 3000 men at Rodosto, sixty miles from Bulair ; a force—amount unknown—at Kissen, thirty miles off; and the roads from the north, through Malgara, and generally, are bad. I think, therefore, they could not approach the place under three days, or have a large force there in less than six days.

In twenty-four hours we could land at Gallipoli a naval brigade of 500 men, and flank the approaches to a certain extent in the ships. This would give the Turks the encouragement and assurance they require, after their recent defeats, to hold the ground for a few days. If orders were sent to the Governor of Malta to co-operate with me, I should send Agincourt, Achilles, and Raleigh to Malta, and they should return in eight days to Gallipoli with 3000 troops. (Distance to Malta, 690 miles; return to Gallipoli, 730 miles.) Steamers should be chartered at Malta, and despatched forty eight hours after receipt of the telegram, bringing guns, ammunition, biscuit, rum, and cocoa for the troops, and 2000 tons of coals for this squadron. With 3500 English, the ships, and the Turks, I believe we should hold the place for a fortnight against anything the Russians could do.

By that time—that is, twenty-two days from the receipt of your telegram—you ought to be able to send us the 8000 or 10,000 men that would make this place safe for ever. The first steps will be the most important, and of course the orders must be prompt and decided from home. Troops, ships, and Ambassador would then co-operate. Transport animals and temporary shelter for the troops will be the greatest difficulty, but I believe we can meet them. You may depend I will feed and shelter my own men, and I have great confidence in our contractor, who is an Englishman. I mention this only that you may not suppose such matters have not been considered.

Yours faithfully

                        G. Phipps Hornby

Gallipoli - The Russo-Turkish War

In April 1876 a revolt had broke out in Bulgaria. A minor, if bloody affair, the matter would escalate over the next two years, dragging in one by one four of the Great Powers of Europe until the world was on the brink of a global war.

This was to be the last time the Great Powers would fight before the First World War. The conflict created the borders of southwestern Europe that we know today, and saw the first use of the Red crescent flag. 

In the grander scheme of things, the Bulgarian revolt was part of the long decline of the Ottoman Empire. In 1683 it had been on the verge of capturing Vienna, but now had only a toe hold in Europe. But even as the Ottoman Empire declined, its great enemy, the Austrian Empire, had also waned. The balance of power in Europe was shifting. France had been humbled by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and so the mightiest powers in Europe were Germany, with it's great industry, Russian, with its rapidly expanding empire in Central Asia, and, of course, Britain, whose industry and empire were both the envy of the world. 

It was in the interests of Russia that the Ottoman's be driven from the Balkans, so the slavs of its Christian provinces could join the Russian Empire, and it was in the interests of Britain that they stay, so that Russia could not gain a Mediterranean port from which she could threaten the flow of trade through the Suez Canal to Britain. It was in the interests of Germany that there should be peace.  

In 1854 France and Britain had come to Turkey's aid when Russia had attacked. This time France was not a player and public opinion in Britain, outraged by the behaviour of Turkish irregulars was not on the side of the Ottomans. 

Russian first bought off Austria-Hungary by offering them the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovia, then used her ally Serbia to attempt to capture Bulgaria. When this failed, she declared war herself. 

The forces were actually fairly even. 300,000 Russians faced 200,000 Turks, who had the advantage of interior lines of communication, control of the sea, and fortified positions. In terms of abilities the two sides were very different. Russians who were strategically aggressive but tactically inept. The Ottomans were strategically passive but tactically brilliant. 

This was shown by the fate of Osman Pasha, and his army of 30,000 men. Outmanoevred and surrounded, he then fought off a succession of Russian attacks in a siege that would make him famous and preserve Ottoman Europe for another forty years. 

After the third failed attack on Osman's position in the unremarkable town of Plevna, when Csar Nicholas II and invited dignitaries from across Europe watched 100,000 Russian soldiers fail to defeat a force less than a third of their size, the Russians called in General Todleben, the hero of Sevastopol. He encircled the town with siege works and when the starving Turks attempted to break out they were repulsed in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The next day Osman Pasha surrendered.

It was now December 1877. Constantinople was held by no more than 20,000 Turkish troops. By the end of January 1878 the Russian army had reached the village of San Stefano, nine miles west of Constantinople. Fearing that the great city would fall, British Prime Minister Disraeli sent the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet through the Dardanelles to defend it. At the same time 200,000 Austro-Hungarian troops were massing on the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The stage was now set for a confrontation between the Great Powers.